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THE EAST END, THE WEST END, AND KING’S CROSS:
ON CLUSTERING IN THE FOUR-PLAYER HOTELLING GAME
STEFFEN HUCK, WIELAND MÜLLER, and NICOLAAS J. VRIEND
∗
We study experimentally a standard four-player Hotelling location game with a
uniform density of consumers and inelastic demand. The pure strategy Nash equilib-
rium conﬁguration consists of two ﬁrms located at one quarter of the “linear city,”
and the other two at three quarters. We do not observe convergence to such an equi-
librium. In our experimental data we ﬁnd three clusters. Besides the direct proximity
of the two equilibrium locations, this concerns the focal midpoint. Moreover, we
observe that whereas this midpoint appears to become more notable over time, other
focal points fade away. We explain how these observations are related to best-response
dynamics, and to the fact that the players rely on best-responses in particular when
they are close to the equilibrium conﬁguration. (JEL C72, C91, D21, D43)
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the popularity of simple location
models in industrial economics and voting
theory, in the tradition following Hotelling
(1929), and despite the recent rise of the
experimental method in economics, there
have been only few experimental tests of
such models. Brown–Kruse et al. (1993) and
Brown–Kruse and Schenk (1999) study mod-
els with elastic demand, while Collins and
Sherstyuk (2000) focus on the simpler case—
which we address, too—where demand is
inelastic.
Collins and Sherstyuk implement a model
with three agents who choose locations on
a line segment with a uniform density of
consumers (who, due to the assumption of
inelastic demand, can also be seen as voters
with one vote each). It is well known that
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this game has no pure-strategy equilibrium
(see Eaton and Lipsey [1975]). Normalizing
the line segment to the unit interval, the
unique mixed-strategy equilibrium prescribes
uniform randomization over the middle two
quarters for all ﬁrms (see Shaked [1982]).
As it is a well-established fact that experi-
mental subjects have difﬁculties in randomiz-
ing (see, for example, Rapoport and Budescu
[1997]) it is not very surprising that Collins
and Sherstyuk do not ﬁnd strong support for
the equilibrium hypothesis. Their empirical
distribution of choices is M-shaped and has a
considerably larger support than the equilib-
rium distribution.
In this study we analyze the case of four
agents, with uniform consumer density and
inelastic demand. As the equilibrium of this
case implies that two ﬁrms locate at the edge
of the ﬁrst and second quarters, and the other
two at the edge of the third and fourth quar-
ters, this setup seems ideal for the investiga-
tion of various matters.
First, there is no other number of agents
where the equilibrium prediction has a bet-
ter chance to be valid.
1 With three com-
petitors, the unique symmetric equilibrium
is mixed; with ﬁve the unique equilib-
rium conﬁguration is asymmetric and implies
unequal payoffs; and with six and more
agents the equilibrium conﬁgurations cease
1. Apart from two, where equilibrium play seems
trivial.
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to be unique. Thus, only the two- and the
four-agent cases yield unique pure and sym-
metric equilibrium conﬁgurations that give
identical payoffs to all agents.
Second, the equilibrium in the four-agent
case has a property that makes it interest-
ing from a behavioral and empirical point of
view. Not only the focal midpoint is empty
but the whole middle segment of the “linear
city” is empty as well. That is, notwithstand-
ing the nice theoretical properties, the equi-
librium is not entirely intuitive and is also
conﬂicting with casual empirical evidence.
There are no cities without shops in the cen-
ter, nor are there democracies without parties
located in the political middle ground.
The picture we will discern in our exper-
imental data can be summarized in the fol-
lowing experimental result. In the four-seller
case, the equilibrium prediction is of sub-
stantial but limited help. About one-third of
all choices are clustered around the equi-
librium locations, but in no session do we
observe convergence to equilibrium. At the
same time, the focal midpoint exerts a con-
siderable attraction with almost 10% of all
choices clustered around it. Consumers proﬁt
from this considerably in the form of lower
transportation costs.
The remainder of the article is organized
as follows. In section II we give a theoret-
ical account of the model we implement.
In section III we present the experimental
design. In section IV we analyze the results
and explain the data, and section V con-
cludes.
II. THEORY
Consider a “linear city” in which four ﬁrms
produce a good at constant marginal cost.
The price of the good is ﬁxed (due to some
unmodeled features of the market). Conse-
quently, costs can be normalized to zero and
the price to one. To sell the goods, the ﬁrms
simultaneously choose a location on the unit
interval (0, 1). A continuum of consumers
with mass 1 is uniformly distributed along
the interval. Each consumer buys 1 unit of
the good. Due to (unmodeled) transportation
costs, each consumer buys her good at the
ﬁrm located closest to her.
As shown, for example, in Eaton and
Lipsey (1975) there is a unique (pure-
strategy) equilibrium conﬁguration of loca-
tions: two ﬁrms locate at one-quarter and
two, the other two at three-quarters. As
proved in Osborne and Pitchik (1986), there
is also a symmetric mixed-strategy equilib-
rium where ﬁrms employ continuous and dif-
ferentiable density functions that are symmet-
ric around one-half as strategies. However,
as Osborne and Pitchik (1986) illustrate, it is
hard to ﬁnd this equilibrium. In Appendix A
we show why ﬁnding it for the four-ﬁrm case
is impossible.
In an experiment a continuous model can
only be approximated by a discrete model with
a sufﬁciently ﬁne grid. Therefore, we next
derive the equilibrium solution of the four-
ﬁrm case with a ﬁnite number of locations.
Let L =  1 2     X be the set of loca-
tions whose cardinality is assumed to be
divisible by four,
2 and let Li ∈ L be ﬁrm
i’s location choice. On each j ∈ L there is
one consumer who buys 1 unit from the ﬁrm
located closest to her, that is, she chooses
aﬁ r mi such that her transportation costs
 j −Li  are minimized. In case of more than
one ﬁrm minimizing consumer j’s transporta-
tion costs we assume that, if there are ﬁrms at
equal distance to the left and to the right of
her, she ﬂips a coin to determine her “direc-
tion,” and if she reaches a location with more
than one seller she buys from each with equal
probability.
3
Without loss of generality we can order
the ﬁrms such that L1 ≤ L2 ≤ L3 ≤ L4.I n
Appendix B we prove the following.
PROPOSITION 1. In each pure-strategy equi-
librium either L1 =X/4 or L1 =X/4+1, L2 =
X/4+1, L3 = 3X/4, and either L4 = 3X/4 or
L4 = 3X/4+1.
Thus, there are four different (pure-strategy)
equilibrium conﬁgurations; considering all
possible permutations, there are 54 differ-
ent equilibria. Notice that we can speak of a
unique equilibrium in the sense that any equi-
librium is characterized by two ﬁrms being
located at the edge of the ﬁrst and the sec-
ond quarter of the “linear city,” and the other
two at the edge of the third and fourth quar-
ter. Moreover, each equilibrium is not only
2. This makes the analysis most convenient. For dif-
ferent sets of locations the results are only slightly dif-
ferent. We omit those because we implement a number
divisible by four in the experiment.
3. As explained in the instructions to the players
(see Appendix C), in the experiment we actually imple-
ment an equivalent deterministic version of the con-
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FIGURE 1
The Mixed Equilibrium Probability Distribution for X = 100
“symmetric” with respect to the midpoint of
the “linear city,” but is also “symmetric” as
described in the following.
COROLLARY 1. In each pure-strategy equi-
librium, each ﬁrm receives an identical payoff
of X/4.
Solving analytically for the (doubly sym-
metric) mixed-strategy equilibria is virtually
impossible. Therefore, we employed numer-
ical methods for different values of X.
Figure 1 shows the equilibrium for the case of
X = 100.
4 The intuition behind the peculiar
zigzagging shape of the equilibrium distribu-
tion is the following. First, overall the equilib-
rium probability distribution must be in some
sense U-shaped, with the extremes of the
city excluded from the support. Hence, there
must be considerable mass at the left and
right ends of the support. The locations out-
side the support are too risky, as a competitor
choosing a somewhat more central location
will cut a player off from most of the market,
leaving only the fringes of the city, which is
acceptable only if this fringe demand is large
enough. For the locations in the middle of
the support there is the risk that a player is
4. The expected demand for each ﬁrm is “exactly”
(with 15 zeros behind the decimal point) 25 for each
location in the support of the equilibrium strategy. The
computer is still running for the case of X = 1 000.
squeezed in by two competitors. With a uni-
form distribution, this risk is too great and
the expected payoffs would be lowest in the
middle. Hence some probability mass must
be shifted away from the center. Second, sup-
pose a player is at the ﬁrst position on the left
that is played with positive probability, and
she considers moving one step to the right.
In equilibrium both locations have to give the
same expected payoff. The beneﬁt of moving
one step to the right is small, but the poten-
tial loss is enormous because she faces the
risk of seeing the complete left tail of the
consumer population cut off by a rival choos-
ing her current position. Hence to be indif-
ferent, the probability that someone occupies
this ﬁrst position has to be low. Combining
this with the overall U-shape gives the ﬁrst
zigzag step.
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The computerized experiment was con-
ducted at Humboldt University in November
and December 1998. Subjects were mostly
undergraduate students of economics or busi-
ness administration. On arrival in the lab
they were assigned a computer screen and
received written instructions.
5 After reading
5. For a translation of the instructions see
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them, questions could be asked and were
answered privately. In total, six sessions con-
sisting of 50 rounds were conducted with four
participants each. The number of rounds to
be played was common information. In the
instructions, subjects were informed about
the following. In the experiment each partic-
ipant has the role of a seller who, just like
three other sellers, has the opportunity to
sell a ﬁctitious product in a market. There
are 1,000 simulated buyers, which are located
on the integer points of a line from 1 to
1,000. The task of a seller is to choose a
position (a number from 1 to 1,000) on the
line with the understanding that all sellers
do this simultaneously and that each con-
sumer wishes to buy exactly 1 unit per round.
Because costs are symmetric across sellers
(1 Taler per unit), consumers would buy from
the seller to whom the distance is shortest.
(For how ties were broken see the instruc-
tions in Appendix C.)
Locations could be speciﬁed using two
different methods (see Figure 2). The ﬁrst
method was to move an arrow to a speciﬁc
position on a black line that had no ticks
indicating numbers. The numerical value of
the chosen location was then also shown in a
small box next to the line. At the start of each
round the arrow appeared at a neutral “park-
ing position” on the right edge of the screen.
The second method to enter a location was
to type it directly into the aforementioned
box. A click on a special icon (“Go!”) then
automatically moved the arrow to the cor-
responding position on the line. After each
round a participant was informed about her
FIGURE 2
A Screen Shot
own and the positions of the other three sell-
ers in the preceding round. This was done
in horizontally arranged and colored boxes
(one color for each participant). Addition-
ally, arrows with the same colors emanating
from the boxes pointed to the corresponding
positions on a line below the boxes. A given
player’s own position was always shown in
the green box (with a green arrow), whereas
each of the other participants in the market
was represented by one of the other colors
(blue, yellow, red), which was held constant
during the entire experiment.
6 Each partici-
pant was informed about her own proﬁt in
the most recent round as well as about cumu-
lative proﬁts. Furthermore, the participants
were able to recall the four positions of all
preceding rounds by clicking on special icons
for going back and forth.
Subjects were informed that the sum of
all proﬁts accumulated during the experiment
would determine their ﬁnal monetary payoff.
The exchange rate was Taler 400 = DM 1.
A session lasted between 45 and 60 minutes,
and subjects’ mean earnings were DM 31.25.
IV. RESULTS
Figure 3 displays the frequency distribu-
tion of location choices across all periods
(top), and for the ﬁrst and second half of
the experiment separately (bottom), in each
case aggregated over all sessions. The even-
tual distribution is W-shaped with modes at
the two equilibrium locations and the focal
middle. Thus, both our intuitions are con-
ﬁrmed. The equilibrium locations are attrac-
tive, but so is the center of the city. The three
locations around which there are clusters of
ﬁrms—the two equilibrium locations and the
focal midpoint—in turn suggest the title of
the article.
7
Comparing the second half of the experi-
ment with the ﬁrst half, the following points
emerge. First, there is a trend toward both
6. For instance, the player whose screen is shown
in Figure 2 chose location 179 in round 2, which implied
a payoff of 224.5 Taler in that round. In round 3 he
considers choosing location 554.
7. King’s Cross does not only correspond to
Schelling’s focal Grand Central, it also came out on top
in an undergraduate class room game at Queen Mary
presenting a London Underground variant of Schelling’s
coordination problem.HUCK, MÜLLER, & VRIEND: CLUSTERING IN THE HOTELLING GAME 235
FIGURE 3
Frequency Distribution of Locations
more equilibrium behavior and more clus-
tering in the middle, and there is no real
convergence to the equilibrium. Considering
deviations up to a distance of 25 still to be
in a location’s neighborhood, we ﬁnd that
19.2% of all choices in the second half of the
experiment are clustered around the “west-
ern” equilibrium location, 13.5% around the
“eastern” equilibrium location, and 9.7%
around the midpoint.
8 Second, whereas the
importance of the focal midpoint increases,
other focal points (most notably 400 and 600,
but basically all multiples of 100) actually
fade away. Our investigation of the experi-
8. Notice that the lower frequency around the “east-
ern” location is in part explained by a slight overshooting
toward the “eastern” city limit.236 ECONOMIC INQUIRY
FIGURE 4
The Average Distance from Equilibrium per
Player for Each of the Six Sessions
mental data will be focused on analyzing and
explaining these two points.
With respect to the lack of convergence
to equilibrium, it is interesting to note that
there is not even a slow trend toward an equi-
librium conﬁguration. For each session we
determined the distance from equilibrium in
a given period as follows. We ordered the
players such that L1 ≤L2 ≤L3 ≤L4, and com-
puted the average distance per player in a
given period as D =  L1−250 + L2−251 +
 L3−750 + L4−751  /4.
Figure 4 shows the time series of the aver-
age distance from equilibrium per player in
each of the six sessions, plus the same vari-
able averaged over the six sessions. The aver-
age D over all data is 114.2 (120.6 in the
ﬁrst half, 107.8 in the second half of the
experiment). Three out of six sessions had
a higher average distance in the second half
of the experiment. Overall, the difference
is statistically insigniﬁcant.
9 We see that the
average distance per player ﬂuctuates a lot,
mainly between 50 and 200.
10 Notice that
in most sessions the players are occasionally
very close to equilibrium but then tend to
move away from it again.
The implications for social welfare are
interesting. As ﬁrms are more evenly spread
9. An alternative measure for the distance from
equilibrium would be the standard deviation of proﬁts,
high standard deviations indicating a large distance from
equilibrium (where it is zero). In the ﬁrst half of the
experiments this standard deviation is on average 121.1,
and in the second half 113.5, a difference that is not sig-
niﬁcant.
10. If all players were located in the center, the aver-
age distance would be 250.
out than predicted by the equilibrium, con-
sumers’ transportation costs are lower (the
sum of the ﬁrms’ proﬁts is, by assumption,
constant). In equilibrium, the average travel
distance would be 125. In our data, however,
we observe that this number equals 107.4 in
the ﬁrst half and 105.2 in the second half
(with standard deviations of 35.5 and 34.7,
respectively).
Why, then, do ﬁrms not converge to the
equilibrium outlined in Proposition 1? One
answer could be that ﬁrms actually do play an
equilibrium, namely, the mixed one. But, as
we know from above, the mixed-equilibrium
probability distribution of location choices is
U-shaped, not W-shaped with a cluster in
the center. Hence, mixing as such cannot
fully explain our data. It seems clear that
the middle mode is due to the attractive-
ness of focal King’s Cross. But being focal as
such is of limited help in explaining our data.
This is not so much because a focal-point
explanation is, of course, outside the domain
of standard rationality, but rather because
the prominence of the focal midpoint seems
to augment over time, whereas other focal
points fade away.
The factor explaining both phenomena
(the lack of convergence to equilibrium,
and the different relevance of various focal
points) is the players’ use of myopic best
replies.
11 The pure-strategy equilibria are not
stable under best-reply dynamics. What is
more, best-reply dynamics lead toward the
center. This does not only hold when all play-
ers adhere to best-responses but also in the
following, looser sense. Best-response sets
typically include a range around the center
(even in most equilibria), but not the fringes
of the city (the most extreme locations that
could be a best-response in equilibrium are
X/4 and 3X/4 + 1). Moreover, when one
player moves toward the middle, subsequent
best-reply adjustments imply that the other
players are dragged toward the middle as
well, where they tend to cut off the earlier
mover from large sections of the consumer
population.
11. Here myopic means that each player assumes that
the strategies chosen by the other players in the next
round will be the same as the ones in the previous round.
Thus, players are assumed to be myopic in the sense that
they do not anticipate that the play of rivals may change
from one round to another.HUCK, MÜLLER, & VRIEND: CLUSTERING IN THE HOTELLING GAME 237
As an illustration, consider the following
example. Suppose the ﬁrms are currently in
equilibrium, with one ﬁrm at location 250,
one at 251, and the other two at 750 and
751. Now imagine the ﬁrm at 251 deviating
from its equilibrium location to, say, the mid-
point at 500. It does not lose, as all loca-
tions between the equilibrium locations are
included in its best-reply set. In the next
period, the ﬁrm that remained in the West
End will relocate next to the ﬁrm in the cen-
ter, which deviated ﬁrst. The ﬁrm at 750 may
jump over to either the West End at 249 or
the East End at 752. In the next periods, fur-
ther best-reply adjustments imply that within
two or three periods after the initial devia-
tion all ﬁrms are located within a distance of
two or three from the midpoint. Hence, a sin-
gle best-response deviation from the equilib-
rium (which is not irrational, as it gives the
same payoff as the equilibrium payoff) does
not only lead away from the equilibrium, it
also induces other ﬁrms to move toward the
center of the city.
An analysis of individual relocations shows
that subjects pay considerable attention to
(myopic) best-replies. Some 17.5% adjust-
ments are perfect (myopic) best-replies, and
40.5% are when allowing for errors up to
10% in the payoff dimension (under the
hypothesis that the other ﬁrms do not move).
Moreover, the frequencies of best-replies are
not declining over time (in four of the six ses-
sions myopic best-replies are actually more
frequent in the second half of the experi-
ment).
Hence, best-replies would explain both
the lack of convergence to equilibrium and
the fact that the focal midpoint becomes
more notable, whereas other focal points
fade away. However, reasoning along this
line raises the next question: If ﬁrms pay
so much attention to best-replies, and given
that the equilibrium is unstable under best-
reply dynamics, then, why are there after all
so many (approximate) equilibrium choices?
The answer to this is that the degree of sub-
jects’ adherence to (myopic) best-replies is
situation-dependent.
Considering all sessions and all periods,
we use the median distance from equilibrium
(115.5) to separate the two states “far away
from” and “close to” equilibrium. Allowing
for a 10% error in the payoff dimension, as
previously, it turns out that players choose
a best-reply in 50.0% of the cases in which
the game was close to equilibrium, whereas
this occurs in only 31.0% of the cases far
away from equilibrium. Using these paired
best-response frequencies of the six sessions
as independent observations, we ﬁnd that in
each of the six sessions players choose best-
replies more often when the game is close
to equilibrium. A sign-test shows that this is
signiﬁcant at 0.0156 (one-sided). Moreover,
these higher frequencies of choosing best-
responses when close to equilibrium do not
occur simply because the sizes of the best-
response sets happen to be much larger in
that situation. The size of the best-response
sets is only very weakly negatively correlated
with the distance from equilibrium.
12 In other
words, the players appear to have a dif-
ferent attitude toward best-responses depen-
dent on the situation they face. This explains
why the players are not permanently pulled
away from equilibrium (through the best-
responses) and why we observe the high vari-
ation in the distances from equilibrium within
each session.
The question, then, is why the players have
this different attitude toward best-replies in
the two states. The average gains for the four
players expected from myopic best-replies in
a given period are highly correlated with
the distance from equilibrium.
13 Although the
imagined gains to be made from myopic best-
replies are based on the presumption that the
other players do not move, a presumption
that must be counterfactual when applied to
all players, when play is close to equilibrium,
this may be a reasonable ﬁrst-order approxi-
mation. However, when we are far away from
equilibrium and there are large potential pay-
off gains from best-responses looming for all
players, players must be much less likely to
believe that the other players will actually
stay put. Hence, the players are not com-
pletely myopic.
14
When far away from equilibrium, subjects
obviously try to outguess each other. At this
12. The correlation coefﬁcient is −0 08, with a t-
statistic of −2 56.
13. The correlation coefﬁcient is 0.84 (signiﬁcant at
0.000).
14. This is with good reason, because it turns out
that the total adjustments by the four players in a given
period, calculating total relocations in period t as TRt =
 i Lt
i −Lt−1
i  , is positively correlated with the distance
from equilibrium. The correlation coefﬁcient is 0.43 with
a signiﬁcance level of 0.000.238 ECONOMIC INQUIRY
moment we do not want to speculate which
sophisticated (or perhaps simple) reasoning
process the players might follow in such a sit-
uation. What drives us here is only to ﬁnd an
explanation as to why the players must have
this different attitude toward best-responses
when far away from equilibrium and when
close to it, because this difference plays a key
role in our explanation of the data. The key
to this question is that the assumption that
other players will not move (which under-
lies the notion of myopic best-replies) is far
more realistic when play is close to equilib-
rium. This, in turn, drives players again away
from equilibrium. The cyclic behavior of the
distance from equilibrium results. So do the
three modes.
V. CONCLUSION
Analyzing a standard four-player Hotelling
game, we showed why standard rationality in
the form of an equilibrium prediction is of
limited help. Moreover, we also showed that
a focal-point type of explanation, which is of
course outside the domain of standard ratio-
nality as such, is of equally limited help.
We demonstrated how the pure-strategy
Nash equilibria have the property that they
are unstable under best-reply dynamics. More
speciﬁcally, we illustrated how best-reply
adjustments drag players toward the center
of the linear city. Thus, it is the best-reply
adjustments that makes the midpoint becom-
ing more important over time, whereas other
focal points fade away.
Analyzing the individual choices in the
experiment we found that best-replies form
an important component of the players’
strategies. However, the importance of best-
replies is situation-dependent: the further
ﬁrms are off the equilibrium the less likely
are best-replies and vice versa. Players trust
the hypothesis that others will not move
much less when the current conﬁguration is
irrational. This different attitude toward best-
replies in turn explains why there is a ten-
dency back toward equilibrium when far away
from it and away from equilibrium when
close to it.
On the aggregate level these movements
result in a W-shaped distribution of locations.
There are clusters around the equilibrium
positions and the focal midpoint. Hence, we
should not be surprised when, for example,
democracies with four parties (as Germany
used to be) do not have two left-wing and two
right-wing parties.
APPENDIX A: ON THE SYMMETRIC MIXED
EQUILIBRIUM IN THE CONTINUOUS CASE
As usual, let the consumers be evenly distributed along
the interval (0, 1). A mixed strategy is a probability mea-
sure F = F z over (0, 1). As in Shaked (1982) we are
looking for a doubly symmetric solution suggested by
the symmetric nature of the problem. Hence, we assume
that F is symmetric around one-half and is employed by
all ﬁrms. According to a result of Dasgupta and Maskin
(1986a, 1986b) F is atomless. Let f be the density func-
tion of F. The support of f is assumed to be a subin-
terval of    1−  ,0≤  <1. Furthermore, assume that
three ﬁrms choose their location according to f. Then,
the expected payoff of the fourth ﬁrm choosing location
z ∈    1−   is given by
A z  = 3
 z
 

















 z+ x−z /2 f x  1−F x  
2 dx 
For f to be an equilibrium, A must be constant over
the support, hence A  z =0 for all z∈   1−  . Differ-
entiating A z  with respect to z, this condition is equiv-
alent to (see also Osborne and Pitchik [1986])
 1/2 

2rf r  2F r t 1−F r  −1 + 1/3 +F r 
× F r  1− 2/3  F r  +2f r  −1 





xf x F x dx− 1/2 r

= 0 
It is above all the integral in this equation that makes
even a numeric analysis impossible.
APPENDIX B: ON PURE-STRATEGY EQUILIBRIA
IN THE DISCRETE CASE
Proof of Proposition 1: Remember that L =  1 2    ,
X , with X being a multiple of 4 and that we order
the ﬁrms such that L1 ≤ L2 ≤ L3 ≤ L4.B y i we denote
ﬁrm i’s (expected) proﬁt. Observe that  i ≥ max X −
L4 L 1−1  for all ﬁrms i, because otherwise ﬁrm i could
improve its payoff by locating itself at the outside just
next to ﬁrm 1 or 4. Because  i i = X, we get max X−
L4 L 1 −1  ≤  X/4 , and hence
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Next we establish the following fact:
L2 −L1 ≤ 1 and L4 −L3 ≤ 1  (B2)
To see that (B2) holds true, suppose the opposite, that
is, L2 −L1 > 1. Then ﬁrm 1 could increase its proﬁt by
choosing L1 +1, analogously for ﬁrms 3 and 4. Combin-
ing (1) and (2) we get
L2 ≤  X/4 +2 and L3 ≥  3X/4 −1  (B3)
For the moment we will focus on those cases in which
the following holds: L3−L2 > 1. We will show later that
this is the general case, and we will analyze as well the
single special case where this does not hold.
Consider ﬁrst L1  = L2. Then (because otherwise ﬁrm
1 would like to relocate between ﬁrms 2 and 3) it must
hold that
L1 ≥  L3 −L2 /2 =  L3 −L1 −1 /2  (B4)
From (B4) we get that L1 ≥  L3 −1 /3. Combining this
with (B3) leads to
L1 ≥  X/4 − 2/3   (B5)
Since only integer values are allowed, combining (B1)
and (B5) gives L1 ∈   X/4   X/4 +1 . Now suppose
ﬁrm 1 was located at  X/4 +1. Since L1  =L2, the proﬁt
of ﬁrm 1 is greater than  X/4 , and there must be at
least one ﬁrm earning less than  X/4 , which it could get
by switching to L1 −1, that is,  X/4 . Hence, we must
have
L1 = X/4 and L2 = X/4+1  (B6)
Next suppose L1 = L2. Analogous to (B4), in that case










From (B7) it follows that L1 ≥ L3+1 /3. Combining this
again with (B3) and (B1) leads to L1 ∈   X/4   X/4 +
1 . Now suppose that ﬁrms 1 and 2 were located at
 X/4 . This is not an equilibrium because each of them
would have an incentive to move to  X/4 +1. Hence,
we must have
L1 = L2 =  X/4 +1  (B8)
To see that L3 −L2 > 1 is indeed the general case,
observe ﬁrst of all that it follows directly from (B3)
whenever X>8. Now, suppose X ≤ 8. If L1  = L2 we
cannot have L1 =  X/4 +1 for the reason given above.
Hence we still have L3 −L2 > 1. From (B3) it follows
that the same applies if L1 = L2. The only special case
arises when X = 4. If L1  = L2, then again we cannot
get L1 =  X/4 +1 for the same reason as above. Hence
L1 =  X/4  and L2 =  X/4 +1. If L1 = L2, then this
cannot happen at  X/4  because either L3 = 3X/4 −1,
in which case the proﬁt of ﬁrm 1 would be less than
 X/4 , which it could secure by choosing an empty loca-
tion, or L3 ≥  3X/4 , in which case the general analysis
of above goes through. Hence, it must be the case that
L1 = L2 =  X/4 +1.
In other words, for any X>0, with X a multiple of
4, all equilibrium conﬁgurations must conform to (B6)
and (B8). Analogous reasoning for ﬁrms 3 and 4 leads to
L3 =  3X/4  and L4 =  3X/4 +1 (B9)
or
L3 = L4 = 3X/4  (B10)
Having excluded all alternative conﬁgurations, the
proof is completed by demonstrating that each combina-
tion of either (B6) or (B8) with either (B9) or (B10) is
indeed an equilibrium conﬁguration by checking all best-
responses.
Proof of Corollary 1: Straightforward proﬁt calcula-
tions for each ﬁrm for each equilibrium conﬁguration.
APPENDIX C: TRANSLATION OF THE
INSTRUCTIONS
Welcome to the experiment. Please read these instructions
carefully. Do not talk to your neighbors. Please keep quiet
during the entire experiment. If you have any questions,
please raise your hand. We will then come to your place.
In our experiment you can earn different amounts of
money, depending on your behavior and that of other
participants who are matched with you.
In this experiment you have the role of a seller, who
supplies a ﬁctitious product together with three other
sellers on a market. You and the other three participants
have the opportunity to sell the product to a group of
1,000 simulated buyers at a price of 1 Taler per unit. The
buyers are located on the integer points of a line (from
1 to 1,000). You and the other sellers will simultaneously
choose a location (a number from 1 to 1,000) on this
line. All consumers want to buy exactly 1 unit of the
product. Since the product has the same price of 1 Taler
at every seller, the buyers purchase the product at the
seller located closest to her. Each ﬁrm sells as many units
of the product as consumers come to buy there and it
earns exactly this amount of money. To make it not too
complicated we assume that a consumer who is located
in the middle of two ﬁrms (and has by that the same
distance to both of the sellers) is “split up” and buys half
a unit from the left and half a unit from the right seller.
In the case of more than one seller located at the same
location, we assume that they serve the demand in even
shares. Thereby it could happen that a fraction of a unit
is sold. An example will explain this option: Assume that
a consumer is located in the middle between two sellers
at the same place to the left and one seller to the right,
i.e., he has the same way to the two sellers on the left-
hand side and to the seller on the right-hand site. Then
this consumer will buy half a unit of the product from
the right sellers and half a unit of the product from the
left seller, i.e., both sellers to the left sell one-quarter of
a unit and the seller to the right sells one-half of a unit.
The experiment consists of 50 rounds. At the begin-
ning of each round you have to choose a location on
the line. There are two methods of doing this: the ﬁrst
method is to move the green arrow to a speciﬁc position
on the line by clicking this point on the line with the240 ECONOMIC INQUIRY
pointer. The green arrow is then automatically placed
there. In this case the numerical value of this position
is simultaneously shown in the box next to the line. The
second method is to type in the position (a number from
1 and 1,000) into the box next to the line. By clicking
the ﬁeld “Go,” the arrow moves automatically to the
corresponding position on the line. Of course, you can
choose a combination of both methods, e.g., determine a
rough position with the arrow and choose afterward the
exact position by a numerical speciﬁcation. If you have
ﬁnally chosen a location, conﬁrm your decision by press-
ing the OK button. In every round you can choose an
arbitrary new position or you can choose an old position
again.
After each round your position and the positions of
the other three participants in the preceding round are
shown. They appear in boxes of different colors (one
color for each participant). Additionally, arrows of the
same color, emanating from the boxes, point to the cor-
responding position on the line. Take into account that
your own position is always displayed in a green box
(respectively by a green arrow). The positions of the
other participants are displayed in a blue, yellow, or red
box. The assignment of the colors to the other partici-
pants is constant during the entire experiment. Further-
more, you will be informed after each round about your
own proﬁt in the last round and your present accumu-
lated sum of proﬁts. You can ﬁnd this information in the
upper part of the screen.
In each round you can recall the four positions of
past rounds. To do this just click on the ﬁelds labeled
“back” [and] “forth” located at the upper right part of
the screen.
During the entire experiment you are matched with
the same three other participants who will be randomly
assigned to you. Each group of four participants serve its
own market.
Your ﬁnal proﬁt is determined by the sum of all prof-
its earned during the 50 rounds. You will get for every
400 Talers 1 DM. You get your payment immediately
after the experiment.
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